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*uest Editorial
The Law as Schoolmaster
by Anne Wicker Kuhn
)requently called the master of the heavy metaphor, St. Paul
very nearly outdid himself when he wrote to the *alatians (324) that
the law was our schoolmaster, to bring us unto Christ. Those who
search the writings of the New Testament for any disparagement of
the Law, search in vain. The Law is declared to be 
good
, 
holy

(Romans 712), and 
spiritual
 (Romans 714).
In the *alatian letter, the Law is declared to be not merely
intrinsically and affirmatively good, but actively and functionally
creative. The metaphor of Schoolmaster appeals in an especially
powerful manner to one who has devoted much of her life to the
ministry of teaching, particularly in the area of modern foreign
languages. It may be helpful to note some of the roles and obligations
of the teacher in gaining a clue to the functional uses of the Biblical
Law, including the basic moral and ceremonial laws as given in the
Pentateuch.
The conscientious school teacher is dedicated, first of all, to the
task of creating within students an intellectual want and need ᪽
elements which underlie the entire process of learning. The effective
teacher does this not to frustrate the learners, but to challenge them
to effort and to striving for something further, something better.
The effective teacher must also, of necessity, create within students
a sense of discipline. )ree-flowing learning, so greatly praised by
avant garde educators, has proved to be weak and ineffective. The
Law begins with rule as well as action. Indeed, it is within this context
that the two conventional divisions of Old Testament Law ᪽ moral
and ceremonial ᪽ operate. 'iscipHne is used not as a means of
Mrs. Anne Wicker Kuhn, a guest contributor to this Mournal,
served as professor of *erman at Asbury College for twelve years.
She completed graduate studies at Harvard University, Boston
University, Trinity College in London, and the University of
Munich.
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demonstrating personal authority, but as a prerequisite to vital
learning.
In applying the learning process, the dedicated and conscientious
teacher seeks not merely to impart information, but to expose the
educand to the inner and deeper meanings of things. The teacher
must make the learner aware of the coherence of all knowledge ᪽ to
the pattern which may be found in the adventure of exploring ideas.
It is here that the similarity between the truly concerned teacher and
the Law as schoolmaster appears. The law is designed not simply as a
guide to conduct, but as something which reveals *od
s essential
nature.
The dedicated teacher furthermore recogni]es the temporary and
progressive nature of hisher task. That is to say, the teacher avoids
at all costs the student
s building of long-time dependence upon the
teacher, reali]ing the absolute necessity for the development of
maturity which prepares the student for life at its best. This maturity
is one of *od
s greatest gifts to the alert person ᪽ the person always
glimpsing beyond the present educative process.
So it was also the function of the Law in the historic succession of
steps in *od
s education of the race. Beginning with a chosen people,
*od used Law as a means of producing fixed centers of spiritual
conviction upon which might be built, in the fullness of time, a
receptivity to our Lord. And as true education points to something
beyond itself, so the Law as Schoolmaster sought always to engender
a sense of incompleteness. Such was accomplished by the
development of an underlying conviction that genuine maturity was
unattainable through legal obedience ᪽ a perplexity to those under
the tutorship of the Law. But this perplexity was never engendered as
an end in itself rather it was intended to serve the purpose of creating
a sense of want plus anticipation. And if the moral law produced a
feeling of want and deficiency, the ceremonial law produced a strong
intimation of the Christ ᪽ the One who came in the fullness of*od
s
time.
It appears from the foregoing, that the Old Testament Law
fulfilled in an admirable manner the best intimations of the dedicated
and conscientious teacher. As learning frequently involves painful
disciplines, the painful feeling of frustration, and the painful
awareness of defects and inadequacies, so did the Law. But the
ultimate obMective of the pedagogy of the Law was far above that
which the merely human teacher can envision or impart. The teacher
4
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may challenge to effort, to adventure, and to exhilaration in the
gaining of knowledge, but the Law served the superlative purpose of
bringing men and women to -esus Christ. Small wonder it is that St.
Paul called the Law 
holy
, 
good
 and 
spiritual
. ᪽
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Evil and the Rationality
of Christian Belief
by Michael L. Peterson
'oes Evil Make Christian Belief Irrational"
The reunion of two brothers, Ivan and Alyosha Karama]ov, bears
poignant expression to the problem of evil in human existence. Ivan,
a university-educated and worldly-wise man, has turned atheist over
the inMustice and suffering in the world. Alyosha, in the odyssey of his
separate life, has become a faithful monk and tries to dissuade Ivan
from his all-consuming rebellion against *od. But Ivan swiftly
dismantles each fragmentary answer and continues to press Alyosha
for a sufficient explanation of why *od allows evil in the world.
Reduced to dumb silence, Alyosha approaches Ivan, kisses him
softly, then turns and runs back toward the monastery. As
'ostoevsky says, It was nearly dark, and he felt almost frightened.

Too often, Alyosha is typical of Christian reactions to the problem
of evil emotional response, rational retreat. As the problem of evil is
a genuine intellectual obMection to Christian belief, however, it must
be faced head on.
While the problem of evil is in actuality not Must one problem, but a
cluster of different problems, each having an identifiable structure
and strategy which must be examined and refuted in order to answer
completely the general problem of evil, it is the more modest task of
this article to analy]e only one version of the problem ᪽ a version
that seems to emerge powerfully from the encounter of the two
Karama]ovs that evil can be employed to show Christian belief
irrational, noetically improper, and intellectually substandard.
Of course, the worry over whether or not Christian belief is
rational is only one instance of philosophical reflection on all human
beliefs. The philosophical enterprise operates on the legitimate
Michael L. Peterson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at
Asbury College. He received his Ph.'. from the State University
of NewYork at Buffalo.
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principle that responsible persons do not simply have beliefs, but
follow certain guidelines which help insure that those beliefs are
adequate or true. The set of these guidelines, then, constitutes a kind of
standard of rationality, and the person following them is to that
extent rational. It is no grave embarrassment for thinking persons to
abide by these procedures and sometimes arrive at false beliefs. To do
this is simply to participate in the fallible venture of human
knowledge. But to ignore or violate these accepted parameters of
rationality is a great offense. A
It is not uncommon to find religious believers being accused of
violating rational procedures. The determination to be made is
whether evil may be used to ground the charge that the Christian
believer is in flagrant violation of his intellectual duty and is thus
irrational. Various studies of rationality might lead one to approach
this question in several different ways. To be focused upon here is
what is believed (i.e., a set of propositions central to Christian
theismA) in the determination of whether Christian theism possesses
inherent defects which preclude one from rationally believing it. Can
the accuser in this matter ᪽ the atheist, avoiding the term
s
misleading connotations ᪽ use evil to show that the theist qua theist
is guilty of the charge of irrationality" In terms of existing criteria of
rationality, it can be convincingly argued that Christian theism is not
irrational in light of evil. One must remember, however, that to meet
this atheistic obMection is not to establish that Christian theism is true
or even probably true. That would be quite another task altogether.
An apparently straightforward and promising way to approach
the question of whether evil renders belief in *od irrational would be
to postulate a definition of rationality

 and see whether belief in *od
conforms to it. The chief difficulty with this course is that no final
and complete definition of rationality is available. If there were such
a definition, it would contain a set of conditions which would be
severally necessary and Mointly sufficient for a belief to be rational.
The absence of a universal definition of rationality alone ought to
humble the atheist and reduce his charge. However, there do seem to
be partial definitions, two of which can be carefully fashioned into
arguments from evil against the rationality of Christian theism. The
first criterion of rationality is that beliefs be logically consistent the
second, that they be in close accord with the evidence. Hence, the
atheist may construe Christian theism to be irrational in either of two
ways
7
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(i) Theism is logically inconsistent in its own claims about *od
and evil,
or
(ii) Theism is highly improbable with respect to the evidence of
evil.
Let us call these two broad challenges the logical problem of evil and
the probabilistic problem of evil respectively,A and consider each one
in detail.
The Logical Problem of Evil
Many contemporary authors conceive of the problem of evil as a
completely logical one. The atheistic charge is that orthodox
Christianity is self-contradictory and thus irrational in the strongest
sense. 6 Alvin Plantinga, a theist, explains that in order to establish
the charge of self-contradiction the atheist must identify a set of
propositions which both entails a contradiction and is such that each
proposition in the set is either necessarily true, essential to theism, or
a consequence of such propositions.A Obviously the theist would
have no problem if he were not committed, on some grounds or
other, to each proposition in the set or if the set did not really entail a
contradiction. The following set of propositions is commonly cited
1 *od exists,
2 *od is omnipotent,
3 *od is omniscient,
4 *od is omnibenevolent,
5 Evil exists.
Historically, both theists and atheists have recogni]ed that this set or
a set quite like it constitutes a logical problem for theism. -.L.
Mackie insists that the enigma is insoluble and hence the defeat of
theism
In its simplest form the problem is this *od is omnipotent
*od is wholly good yet evil exists. There seems to be some
contradiction between these propositions so that if any two
of them were true the third would be false. But at the same
time all three are essential parts of most theological
positions the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and
8
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cannot consistently adhere to all three. A
Several characteristics of this problem deserve attention. )irst,
when posed as an a priori question of logical consistency, the
problem does not suppose any matter of fact and can be discussed,
for example, independently of other arguments for the existence of
*od or the non-existence of evil. The point at issue is whether theism
contains contradictory propositions. If so, the atheist is victorious.
Second, it is interesting to note that the belief in the sheer existence of
evil is generally taken as essential to the alleged logical difficulty of
theism. Only a very few authors have attempted to formulate a
logical problem out of propositions 1 - 4 together with, say, this
proposition
6 Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu
tions of evil exist.
Or propostions 1 - 4 and this proposition
7 Unnecessary or gratuitous evil exists.
One would think that the theist would more easily be trapped in a
contradiction if he must hold 1 - 4 and either 6 or 7. Nevertheless, the
traditional formulation of the problem has centered around 5 and the
charge that 1 - 4 entail its denial, or conversely, that 5 entails the
denial of at least one proposition in the set 1 - 4.
The third interesting feature of the logical problem of evil is that
the putative contradiction does not arise immediately on the basis of
1 - 5, but only after certain additional assumptions such as the
following are made
r *od has being or independent ontological status,
2
 An omnipotent being can do anything the description of
which does not involve a logical contradiction,
3
 An omniscient being knows all the ways to eliminate
evil,
4
 An omnibenevolent being is opposed to evil and always
seeks to eliminate it completely,
5
 Evil is not logically necessary.
9
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Presuming that the theist is committed to 1
 - 5
, the rumored implicit
contradiction becomes explicit. It appears that 1 - 4 and 1
 - 5
 do
entail this, to which the theist is unwittingly committed
-A5 Evil does not exist.
Yet the theist is officially committed to this statement
5 Evil exists.
So, the atheist rightly points out that the theist cannot rationally
have it both ways. Mackie, for example, believes that only premises
2
 and 4
, together with 1 - 5, are needed to trap the theist in a
contradiction.A
The Theist
s Rebuttal
When the structure of the atheistic challenge is laid bare in this
way, what the theist must do to rebut it seems clear. The theist must
reMect one or more of the additional premises 1
 - 5
, or any others
which are offered. This, of course, is precisely the spirit of Western
theodicy, showing why *od and *od
s world are different in
important if subtle ways from the descriptions in 1
 - 5
. )or example,
Augustine and Leibni] argue that premises such as 5
 are false
because any created finite world necessarily involves some evil, and
thus, that *od is not culpable for not eliminating it.
A More recently
is the argument of C. S. Lewis, M. B. Ahern, and Alvin Plantinga
that premises such as 4
 do not hold because there are morally
sufficient reasons why *od might not completely eliminate all evil,
the chief reason being the preservation of free will.
Theistic resistance to various propostions in 1
 - 5
 demonstrates
that versions of the logical problem typically commit either of two
fallacies in trying to find a contradiction within theism They either
beg the question by selecting propositions to which the theist is not
committed, or lift out of context propositions to which the theist is
committed, imputing new and convenient meanings to them.
A So,
the self-contradiction strategy for indicting theism of irrationality
does not seem to be a promising avenue of atheistic attack. Of course,
there may be a self-contradiction derivable within traditional
theology, but the continued failure of atheists to produce it seems to
count heavily against the likelihood of their eventual success.
10
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The Probabilistic Problem of Evil
The logical problem of evil is not the only case for the irrationality
of Christian theism. Another, and increasingly popular, rendition of
the problem, of evil is that Christian theism, though not strictly
inconsistent, is improbable (implausible, unlikely, etc.). To accept a
proposition or system of propositions clearly disfavored by a compu
tation of relevant probabilities would be irrational in a different but
nonetheless significant sense. In this kind of probabilistic case
against theism, evil must somehow function as data or evidence for
or against theistic claims. Cornman and Lehrer offer a brief descrip
tion of the kind of world in which we live and then write
*iven this world, then, it seems, we should conclude that it is
improbable that it was created or sustained by anything
we would call *od. Thus, given this particular world, it
seems that we should conclude that it is improbable that
*od ᪽ who, if he exists, created the world ᪽ exists.
Consequently, the belief that *od does not exist, rather than
the belief that he exists, would seem to be Mustified by the
evidence we find in this world.
William Rowe makes the argument more pointed
We must then ask whether it is reasonable to believe that all
the instances of profound, seemingly pointless human and
animal suffering lead to greater goods. And, if they should
somehow all lead to greater goods, is it reasonable to believe
that an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have
brought about any of those goods without permitting the
instances of suffering which supposedly lead to them" When
we consider these more general questions in the light of our
experience and knowledge of the variety and profusion of
human and animal suffering occurring daily in our world, it
seems that the answer must be no. It seems quite unlikely
that all the instances of intense human and animal suffering
occurring daily in our world lead to greater goods, and even
more unlikely that if they all do, an omnipotent, omniscient
being could not have achieved at least some of those goods
without permitting the instances of suffering that lead to
them. In the light of our experience and knowledge of the
The Asbury Seminarian
variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our
world, the idea that none of those instances of suffering
could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without
the loss of a greater good seems an extraordinary, absurd
idea, quite beyond our belief. 
A
A
These and similar arguments share at least one basic motif On the
evidence of evil, theism is improbable, and the theist accepting it is
irrational.
Three aspects of the probabilistic problem of evil are noteworthy.
)irst, theism is treated as an internally consistent system which
implies factually testable assertions. Hence, one phase of the debate
must be a posteriori in nature, seeking to ascertain the facts of the
matter (e.g., what kinds of evils exist, whether they lead to greater
goods, etc.). Second, most formulations of the probabilistic
argument operate on the assumption that it is not the sheer fact that
5 Evil exists
which constitutes the negative evidence against theism. Instead they
argue that either the fact that
6 Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu
tions of evil exist,
or that
7 Pointless or gratuitous evil exists
does count against the basic set of theistic propositions 1 4. This
focus is quite a shift from that of the logical problem.
The third aspect of this kind of problem is that, while all versions
of it incorporate the concept of probability to cut against theistic
belief, they seldom provide precise analysis of probability so that we
can follow the pattern of argument. What, exactly, does the atheist
mean when he says that theism is improbable in light of the facts of
evil"
The scholarship on probability theory offers four popular
specifications of the concept of probability. To be inspected here as
to whether the atheist can use any of them in his argument from evil
12
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are the personalist, logical, frequency, and inductive theories of
probability.
The Personalistic Theory of Probability
The personalistic theory of probability might seem to aid the
atheist in his argument against theism. The personalists (e.g., de
)inetti,
5 R. -effrey, I. Hacking
A) classically hold that for each
person there is a credence function (between the real numbers 0 and
1) which records the degree to which that person believes a given
proposition relative to his own already accepted beliefs. Personalists
sometimes claim to be able to measure a person
s degree of belief by
involving him in certain betting situations. The atheist wishing to
phrase his probabilistic argument from evil in personalistic terms
would have to maintain that the probability (as thus defined) of 1 - 4
on, perhaps, 7 is less than .5 (or 50 percent). But what really has
transpired here" All that is being claimed is that a given person,
presumably the atheist in question, has an assemblage of background
beliefs (call it noetic structure) which leads him to conclude that the
probability of 1 - 4 in light of 7 is low.
We can pass over the notorious difficulties in assigning
quantitative measures to beliefs and simply point out the highly
arbitrary nature of any measure at all. At best the probability value
records nothing more than a piece of biographical information about
the atheist, but certainly nothing about the qualities of theism itself
or the theist
s acceptance of it. In fact, given the theist
s own noetic
structure, theism has a fairly high credence function in spite of the
facts of evil. The point here is simply that how well a proposed belief
fares with a given person depends on what other beliefs he already
happens to hold. On this criterion, it would be irrational for a person
to believe that
8 Whales are mammals
if prior beliefs such as
9 All sea creatures are fish,
or
10 No mammals live in the sea
13
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were part of his noetic structure. What background beUefs one
happens to hold, how he comes to hold them, or how he could ever
revise them, are questions which are utterly ignored. Yet, settling
these issues is crucial, giving a respectable case for the irrationality of
theism. So the personalistic interpretation of probability can hardly
be used to show that theistic belief is irrational. One
s next hunch at
this point may be that a person
s subMective belief must at least
roughly correspond to some obMective value which attaches to the
propositions under consideration.
The Logical Interpretation of Probability
The logical interpretation of probability appears to be a more
promising avenue of atheistic attack. Those who hold a logical
concept of probability (e.g., R. Carnap
A and R. Swinburne
A)
describe probability as a completely obMective relation holding
between or among given propositions. One
s degree of belief, then, is
rational only if it conforms to the actual degree of probability of the
proposition in question. )or example, the rational degree of belief,
i.e. the credence function, of
1 1 -ones can swim,
given
12 Nine out of ten Hoosiers can swim and -ones is a
Hoosier,
should be .9 (or 90 percent), provided one has no other relevant
knowledge. )ollowing this interpretation of probability, the atheist
must hold that the probability of 1 - 4, given perhaps 7, is again less
than .5.
But how can the atheist legitimately claim that the set of
propositions 1 - 4, given proposition 7, Must have a low probability"
What is the rule or criterion for assigning probability in these cases"
'oes one Must see the correct probability, consult other relevant
knowledge, or what" If the latter is done, then the atheist
s other
beliefs must be brought up for scrutiny, their respective probabilities
checked, and so on. It is Must not clear that all contingent propositions
have a logical probability, that there is a method for determining
whether they do, or that 7 would disconfirm 1 - 4 anyway. Thus, there
14
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is certainly no auspicious attack from evil which can be generated
from the purely logical concept of probability.
The )requency Theory of Probability
The frequency theory of probability may seem to offer some help
at this point. The frequentists (e.g., H. Reichenbach2o and W.
SalmonA
) hold that probability expresses a ratio or proportion of
events of one kind among events of another kind. An insurance
actuary, for example, might find that the frequency with which death
occurs among American males under thirty-five years of age is 50 out
of 1000, or 5 percent. Hence, the probability of the proposition
13 An American male will die before his thirty-fifth
birthday
is a very low .05.
Those who work with statistical frequencies, however, are
familiar with the difficulties which plague the formation of a
completely adequate method. One problem is obtaining proper
samples of the two classes of events. A second problem is correctly
extrapolating the observed samples to the unobserved cases. And a
third ᪽ a notoriously difficult one ᪽ is that of the single case, that
unique event for which no reference class at all can be found.
When the issue concerns the probability of theism, the problems
are particularly exacerbating. How can we observe, for example, the
relative frequency with which other worlds containing evils (similar
to the evils we know) are also divinely created, such that we can
ascertain the probability that this world is created by deity" Our
world is the most difficult single case for which we have no other
similar actual cases constituting a relevant reference class. At our
feeble best, we can concoct possible worlds or analogous cases and
try to draw some fragmentary conclusions.
Creating analogous cases from previous knowledge or experience,
however, revives the skeletons in the personalist
s closet and totally
skirts the crucial issues at the foundation of the general frequency
view. Such a maneuver simply opens the door through which the
theist and atheist may come to perfectly legitimate, but quite
different, conclusions. It appears, then, that the frequency
interpretation of probability offers the atheist no help in arguing for
the strong improbability of theism.
15
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The Inductive Theory of Probability
The inductive theory of probabiUty pertains to the hkelihood that
a hypothesis is true in Hght of relevant factual evidence. Some
authors attempt to assign quantitative probability value to
hypotheses, but the maMority of them believe that ordinary
qualitative values are appropriate (e.g., low, high, etc.). At any
rate, all of these authors (e.g., C. HempePA and K. PopperAs)
interpret probability to be closely associated with scientific
procedures. Basically, scientific induction consists in deriving the test
implications of a given hypothesis and then checking (e.g., by
observation, experiment, etc.) whether the anticipated results occur.
Suppose that we are in ancient times and want to test the hypothesis
that
14 The earth is round.
The hypothesis H by itself does not yield readily testable statements
T, but does so only upon the addition of some assumption(s) A, such
as
15 Lunar eclipses are due to the earth
s shadow cast upon
the moon.
Now, from 14 and 15 it clearly followsAA that
16 Lunar eclipses are round shaped.
The structure of reasoning here may be schemati]ed like this
>H  A@ ! T
evidence tends to confirm T
Therefore, probably H,
where H  14, A  15, and T  16. On the other hand, if the evidence
disconfirms T, the probability of H decreases, and on the schema
looks like this
>H  A- ! T
evidence tends to confirm 
AT
Therefore, probably 
AH.
16
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On this scheme, the atheist must argue that theism, when treated as
a hypothesis, possesses a very low probability on the evidence of evil.
As we have already seen, 1 - 4 do not straightforwardly imply
anything about *od
s disposition of evil, and do so only when
conMoined with at least one additional assumption. Since there may
be good reasons for *od to allow not Must the sheer existence of evil,
but great amounts and variety of evil, the strongest atheistic attack
would include the assumption that
17 *od would not allow unnecessary or gratuitous evil
to exist. 25
*ratuitous evils, to stipulate, are those evils which are not directly
and specifically compensated by greater goods. Clearly, from 1 - 4as
the initial theistic hypothesis, together with 17 as an auxiliary
assumption, it follows that
7 Unnecessary or gratuitous evil does not exist.
Mounted on the schema, the atheist
s reasoning takes this form
>(1)-(4)  (17)@ !( 7)
probably a (
A7), or (7)
Therefore, probably AA>(1) - (4)@.
Since it seems plausible and perhaps probable that 7 ᪽ the
contradictory of the expected test implication A1 ᪽ is the case,AA the
probability of 1 - 4 is reduced accordingly. Hence, the person
believing 1 - 4 would appear to be irrational, and must give up at least
one of these four claims.
Problems with the Inductive Approach
Although this inductive approach to probability provides the most
respectable argument from evil (an argument whose method is
reminiscent of corresponding theistic arguments within the tradition
of natural theology) theists are still not without adequate reply. The
difficulties of the atheist
s case may be revealed simply by noting
the problems which typically attend the normal scientific use of
inductive-probabilistic reasoning.
17
The Asbury Seminarian
)irst, there is the problem of ascertaining the occurrence or non
occurrence of the test implication Were the instruments accurate,
the reports reliable" In the atheist
s argument, then, he faces the
enormous task of determining the truth of 7. Evils which appear
gratuitous may not really be gratuitous, particularly if one
s
perspective changes, or if a longer time-span is allowed. At best, the
atheist can make a plausible case for the claim that some evils are
really gratuitous. The theist can counter, as many theists have done
in the long tradition of Western theodicy, with explanations of why
those evils are not really gratuitous.
The second difficulty in the atheist
s case is that the assumption
needed to deduce the test consequence is not itself beyond question.
It is true that the maMority of theists agree with the atheists that the
following is a fair assumption
1 7 *od would not allow unnecessary or gratuitous evils to
exist.
This accounts for the fact that most theistic rebuttals of the atheistic
challenge focus on defeating the factual premise 7 and not 17. There
is also room, however, for calling 17 into question. )or example, it is
imaginable that *od might allow gratuitous evils to exist if
eliminating them meant precluding either the actuality or possibility
of greater goods (e.g., *od might allow the painful consequences of a
physically violent act in order not to curtail the scope of human
freedom). Moreover, *od might allow numerous trivial evils to exist
gratuitously while directing his providential activity to more
significant evils.
Last, it might even be argued that *od could allow significant evils
to exist gratuitously, without any form of compensation, and that
this is part of what it means to have a world which is lost. *od may
ultimately redeem persons affected by those evils, but need not
meticulously compensate for every earthly event labeled evil. The
upshot of these probings is simply that assumption 17, which the
atheist needs in order for his argument to go through, is not above
question.
There is yet a deeper problem with the atheistic attack under
consideration. An established requirement for the final evaluation of
any hypothesis is that the total body of available evidence be
consulted. In the present case, evil is certainly one important and
18
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impressive piece of evidence, but is by no means the only relevant
evidence. As long as the atheist insists on testing theism as a kind of
hypothesis, then he must also inspect the large number and variety of
goods present in the world, as well as a wide range of historical and
existential considerations, which might well yield a high probability
for theism. Unless the apparently falsifying evidence of evil is
conclusive, which, as we have Must seen, it is not, then the inductive
appraisal of theism does not look nearly so dim for the theist, but
may actually backfire on the atheist. At least the atheist can no longer
charge that theism is clearly irrational by virture of being wildly
improbable.
)inally, a Matter of Terms
The conclusion of our investigation must be that the atheist cannot
use evil to show that Christian belief is irrational, if by the term
irrational he means either logically inconsistent or highly
improbable. Since there are no other clear and accepted meanings
for the term, it appears that the atheistic program here is totally
misconceived. Upon close examination, the charge that theism is
irrational turns out to be nothing more than a bit of intellectual
imperialism on the part of the atheist. If the chastised atheist would
like to venture the substitute thesis that, in light of the facts of evil.
Christian belief is false rather than downright irrational, there would
emerge a different and more fruitful debate. Of course, the
recalcitrant atheist might still think that theism is irrational and
claim to have other good arguments to prove it. The argument from
evil, however, is not among them. 2

 ᪽
)ootnotes

)yodor 'ostoevsky. The Brothers Karama]ov. trans. Constance *arnett (New
York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See Michael L. Peterson, *od and Evil Problems of Consistency and *ratuity,
The -ournal of Value Inquiry 13, No. 1 (1979), pp. 305-313.
AAWhether gratuitous evil really exists is a vexed question. But it seems difficult to
believe that every evil will or can be rectified in the future, or was the bearer of meaning
when it occurred. )or example, the pain of cutting my finger on a shoestring seems to
be a gratuitous evil. More seriously, the burning to death of infants in the atomic blast
at Hiroshima seems also to be gratuitous. Theists could deny that gratuitous evils exist
and lock themselves into the task of proving their claim for all alleged cases, but this
mode of defence against the problem of evil seems ill-founded and might ultimately
force us to reMect our ordinary moral Mudgments about evils in the world.
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Humanities which allowed me to do the research out of which this article developed.
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-ohn Wesley and the Law
by William M. Arnett
The law has great significance for -ohn Wesley, a significance
which can be fully appreciated only when it is seen in relation to the
gospel. Let the law always prepare for the gospel, writes Wesley to
one of his fellow-preachers (-oseph Cownley), thus emphasi]ing one
of the main functions of the law.
 In the same letter he warns that
preaching on so vital a theme as the love of *od could be counter
productive unless the law is emphasi]ed. With keen perception and
real candor he pin-pointed a danger he observed in his own preaching
and in that of Cownley
s
I see a danger you are in, which perhaps you do not see
yourself Is it not most pleasing to me as well as you to be
always preaching of the love of *od" And is there not a time
when we are peculiarly led thereto, and find a peculiar
blessing therein" Without doubt so it is. But yet it would be
utterly wrong and unscriptural to preach of nothing else. Let
the law always prepare for the gospel. I scarce ever spoke
more earnestly here of the love of *od in Christ than last
night but it was after 1 had been tearing the unawakened in
pieces. *o thou and do likewise. It is true the love of *od in
Christ alone feeds His children but even they are to be
guided as well as fed ᪽ yea, and often physicked too and the
bulk of our hearers must be purged before they are fed else
we only feed the disease. Beware of all honey. It is the best
extreme but it is an extreme. 2
This advice comes out of Wesley
s practical experience as an
evangelist. Even well-intentioned preaching on the love of *od could
veer toward a dangerous sentimentalism and result in the feeding of
the disease of sin rather than effecting its cure. Hence the
William M. Arnett is the )rank Paul Morris Professor of Christian
'octrine at Asbury Theological Seminary. He received the Ph.'.
degree from 'rew University.
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admonition Beware of all honey
Wesley
s emphasis on various functions of the law are a benefit to
both the sinner and the Christian. )ew themes in Wesley
s theology
are as thoroughly thought out as his doctrine of the law writes -ohn
'eschner.3 )ollowing is an investigation of Wesley
s doctrine and
related factors of the law its origin and meaning the Mosaic
dispensation its characteristics and functions its relation to Christ
and the gospel and finally a practical application of its preaching
values.
)our of Wesley
s sermons
 will be of special importance in this
investigation first. 'iscourse V, based on Matthew 517-20, his 13
expositions on the Sermon on the Mount second, The Original,
Nature, Property, and Use of the Law, in which Romans 712 is used
as a text and two discourses on The Law Established Through
)aith, using Romans 33 1 as a basis for each discourse. While these
four sermons are primary sources, there are also significant
comments and insights in Wesley
s scattered writings, particularly in
his Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament, Letters, and
Explanatory Notes Upon the Old Testament.
The Origin and Meaning of the Law
The law, which is for -ohn Wesley the moral law,A pre-dates the
time of Moses. Its origin is to be traced beyond the foundation of the
world, even to the very being of *od Himself.A He describes the law
of *od as a copy of the eternal mind, a transcript of the div ine
nature.

 He defines it as the original ideas of truth and good, which
were lodged in the uncreated mind from eternity.A It was first given
to angels and then to man in paradise and is coeval with his nature.A
It was engraved on man
s heart by the finger of *od, and was thus
divinely written on the inmost spirit both of men and angels.A
)rom another point of view, the law is supreme, unchangeable
reason it is unalterable rectitude it is the everlasting fitness of all
things that are or ever were created.
Related to the origin of the law is the age-old question ofwhether a
thing is right because *od wills it or whether *od wills it because it is
right. Wesley says this question arises because men make a
distinction between the will of *od and *od Himself. He regards the
question as more curious than useful, and to say that the will of
*od, orthat *od Himself, is the cause of the law, is one and the same
thing.A
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Although man soon rebelled against *od, and by breaking the
'ivine law, virtually effaced it out of his heart, *od did not despise
the work of His own hands, and through the sacrifice of His Son, in
some measure, re-inscribed the law on the heart of His dark, sinful
creature. 
3 The prevenient grace of *od became operative
immediately after the fall.
The Mosaic 'ispensation of the Law
On account of man
s continued rebellion and transgressions, the
Mosaic dispensation was introduced. There are two fundamental
aspects to this dispensation the moral law, contained in the Ten
Commandments, and enforced by the prophets, and the ceremonial
or ritual law, which was only designed for a temporary restraint upon
a disobedient and stiffnecked people. The moral law stands on an
entirely different foundation from the ceremonial, for the former was
from the beginning of the world written not on tables of stone, but
on the hearts of all the children of men, when they came out of the
hands of the Creator.

 Every part of the moral law must remain in
force upon all mankind, and in all ages as not depending either on
time or place, or any other circumstances liable to change, but on the
nature of *od, and the nature of man, and their unchangeable
relation to each other.
A In his comment on Exodus 201, relating to
the law of the ten commandments, Wesley says this law *od had
given to man before, it was written in his heart by nature. 
A
The Characteristics of the Law
As expressed in Romans 7 1 2, Wesley stresses the fact that the law
is holy, Must, and good. )irst and foremost, it is holy, the immediate
offspring and express resemblance of *od who is essential holiness. 
A
As sin is, in its very nature, enmity to *od, so His law is enmity to
sin.
A Secondly, the law is Must, the immutable rule of right and
wrong, depending upon the nature and fitness of things, which is
tantamount to saying it is dependent on *od or the will of*od. The
third characteristic of the law is goodness, resembling the source
from which it flows, namely the goodness of *od. The law is good in
its fruits or effects as well as in its nature. 20 The ceremonial law is
good since it points to Christ. 2

In view of these 'ivine qualities, it is obvious why Wesley took
vigorous exception to Luther
s dualistic view of the law as set forth in
his commentary on the Epistle to the *alatians. Luther coupled the
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law with sin, death, hell, and the devil, and taught that Christ delivers
us from them all alike. Wesley said it can no more be proved by
Scripture that Christ delivers us from the law of *od than that He
delivers us from holiness or from heaven. 22 He understood this to be
the source of the grand error of the Moravians whose emphasis was
on no works no law no commandments. 2A Christ has indeed
redeemed us from the curse of the law. but not from the command of
it, for we are still under the law to Christ. 2 The law springs from,
and partakes of, the holy nature of *od it is every way Must and right
in itself it is designed for the good of man.25
-esus Christ and the Law
There is an intimate relationship between -esus Christ and the law
in the thought of Wesley. He states explicitly, and also infers, that
Christ is the great Author of the law.26 He repeatedly refers to
Christ as the Lawgiver, often in superlative terms, as in his
comments on Matthew 729 522 Mark 228 and Hebrews 1029.2A
In fact, says Wesley, It was therefore the Son of *od who delivered
the law to Moses, under the character of -ehovah. 2A In his 'iscourse
on Matthew 513-16, Wesley declares that -esus Christ came not to
destroy but to establish, proclaim, and fulfill the moral law. As
fulfiller of the law, -esus was not simply referring to His own perfect
obedience but, according to Wesley, was saying this
I am come to establish it in its fulness, in spite of all the
glosses of men I am come to place in a full and clear view
whatsoever was dark or obscure therein 1 am come to
declare the true and full import of every part of it to show
the length and breadth, the entire extent, of every
commandment contained therein, and the height and depth,
the inconceivable purity and spirituality of it in all its
branches. 29
Wesley calls this the strongest and most rigorous type of law preach-
ing.3 A Christian cannot live without the law any more than he can
live without Christ. Indeed each is continually sending me to the
other ᪽ the law to Christ, and Christ to the law.A

The Law and the *ospel
This brings one quite naturally to a consideration of the funda-
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mental harmony between the law and the gospel. There is no
contrariety between them, neither does one supersede the other. So
perfect is the harmony and agreement that it is akin to two sides of
the same coin.
The very same words, considered in different respects, are
parts both of the law and of the gospel if they are considered
as commandments, they are parts of the law if as promises,
of the gospel. Thus, Thou shalt love the Lord thy *od with
all thy heart, when considered as a commandment, is a
branch of the law when regarded as a promise, is an
essential part of the gospel ᪽ the gospel being no other than
the commands of the law, proposed by way of promise. A2
Obviously, there is an intimate relationship between the two. On the
one hand, the law continually makes way for, and points us to the
gospel on the other, the gospel continually leads us to a more exact
fulfiUing of the law.AA Thus every command in Holy Scripture may
be considered a covered promise. If . . .*od command thee so, then
thou shalt be able to . . . Exodus 1823a. *od
s biddings are *od
s
enablings. Redemptively and experientially, it is illustrated
beautifully by the necessity of the new birth (-ohn 37) and the 'ivine
provision that follows (-ohn 314), as well as by the command to
pursue holiness or sanctification (Hebrews 1 2 14) and the redemptive
provision (Hebrews 1312) for the reali]ation of holiness in heart and
life.
The )unctions of the Law
The first use of the law is to convince the world of sin, that is, to
slay the sinner. AA The precepts and the sanction of the moral law as
they stand in themselves are a killing ordinance, and bind us down
under the sentence of death. 35 Therefore, it was generally Wesley
s
method to present his hearers with the demands of the moral law
before he proclaimed the good news of the *ospel. It is the ordinary
method of the Spirit of *od to convict sinners by the law, 36 he
writes.
The second use of the law is to bring the convicted sinner to Christ
that he might live. The only right method is first, to wound by the
law and then to heal by the gospel. 3A The law first breaks us, and
kills us with the sight and guilt of sin before Christ cures us, and binds
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us up. 38 Yes, the law is a strict schoolmaster to bring us to Christ.
The third use of the law is to keep us alive by binding us very close
to the Saviour.  It is the grand means whereby the blessed Spirit
prepares the believer for larger communications of the life of*od.A

Hereby the way is prepared for a three-fold function of the law to
instill sanctification or hoHness in the Christian. The law is still of
unspeakable use, says Wesley
. . . first, in convincing us of the sin that yet remains both in
our hearts and lives, and thereby keeping us close to Christ,
that His blood may cleanse us every moment secondly in
deriving strength from our Head into His living members,
whereby He empowers them to do what His law commands
and, thirdly, in confirming our hope of whatever it
commands and we have not yet attained, ᪽ of receiving
grace upon grace, till we are in actual possession of the
fullness of His promises.
A
What a gracious ministry this is It is the springboard for one of
Wesley
s most eloquent and moving exhortations
... for the time to come, never think or speak Hghtly of,
much less dress up as a scarecrow, this blessed instrument of
the grace of *od (i.e., the law). Yea, love and value it for the
sake of Him from whom it came, and of Him to whom it
leads. Let it be thy glory and thy Moy, next to the cross of
Christ. 'eclare its praise, and make it honourable before all
men . . . Keep close to the law, if thou wilt keep close to
Christ hold it fast let it not go. Let this continually lead thee
to the atoning blood, continually confirm thy hope, till all
the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in thee, and thou
art filled with all the fullness of *od.



The Law and the *ospel Means to an End
In his first discourse, The Law Established through )aith, based
on Romans 331, Wesley warns there are at least three ways of
making void the law through faith first, by not preaching the law at
all secondly, by teaching that faith supersedes the necessity of
holiness and third, by living as if faith was designed to excuse us
from holiness. 2
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On the positive side, the law is established in the heart and life of
man, by faith, in three ways
A first, by endeavouring to preach it
>the doctrine of faith@ in its whole extent, to explain and enforce
every part of it, in the same manner as our great Teacher did while
upon the earth secondly, by preaching faith in Christ as not to
supersede, but to produce holiness ᪽ all manner of holiness ᪽ of the
heart and of the life and third and most importantly, by embracing
faith in our own hearts and lives. The works of the law can never
Mustify, but they are the immediate fruit of that gospel faith which
Mustifies. Neither the law, the gospel, nor faith, then, are ends in
themselves. Love is the end. Love is the end ofall the commandments
of *od. )aith, then, was originally designed by *od to re-establish
the law of love.

 This sets the law and the gospel in their proper
perspectives, and strikes a death blow to antinomianism on the one
hand and stifling legalism on the other.
Preaching Values of the Law
Wesley
s sense of balance and proportion is evident in his very
practical advice about preaching the law and the gospel. In one of his
most important letters (to Ebene]er Blackwell"), he shares the results
of his experience as an evangelist, and as -ohn Telford points out,
describes the kind of preaching he had found most effectual in
leading to conviction of sin and true repentance
A
1 think the right method of preaching is this. At our first
beginning to preach at any place, after a general declaration
of the love of *od to sinners and His willingness that they
should be saved, to preach the law in the strongest, the
closest, the most searching manner possible only inter
mixing the gospel here and there, and showing it, as it were
afar off. After more and more of the gospel, in order to begat
faith, to raise into spiritual life those whom the law hath
slain. 
᪽A
So Wesley would not advise preaching the law without the gospel,
any more than the gospel without the law.
I mean by 
preaching the gospel
 preaching the love of *od
to sinners, preaching the life, death, resurrection, and
intercession of Christ, with all the blessings which in
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consequence thereof are freely given to true believers. By

preaching the law
 I mean explaining and enforcing the
commands of Christ briefly comprised in the Sermon on the
Mount.
In brief, Wesley
s strategy was to preach the law to men until they
knew themselves to be sinners, then to preach Christ to them as
sinners. One in a thousand may have been awakened by the gospel
but this is no general rule the ordinary method of *od is, to convict
sinners by the law, and that only.

A
So once again Wesley would say, Let the law always prepare for
the gospel. It is very apparent that his preaching advice was a wise
application of his theology. In our time one does well to ponder
carefully and to heed Mudicially the advice Wesley gave to the people
called Methodist Love the strictest preaching best, that which
most searches the heart and shows you wherein you are unlike Christ,
and that which presses you most to love him with all your heart and
serve him with all your strength. 
᪽A ᪽
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 S2,56 Burwash, pp. 248,342.
2Uohn Wesley, N.T. Notes, pp. 44, 31, 148, 840.
Am. T. Notes, p. 420.
2951,401 Burwash, p. 248.
3051,405 Burwash, p. 250.
3152,55 Burwash, p. 342.
3A51,403 Burwash, p. 249.
AUbid
AA52,52 Burwash, p. 341.
3
-ohn Wesley, N. T. Notes, p. 650. Note on II Corinthians 36.
3652,52 Burwash, p. 340.
3Uohn Wesley, A Christian Library (London Printed by T. Cordeaux, for T.
Blanshard, 1819) V, p. 17. )rom the Rev. Robert Bolton, Instructions for Rightly
Comforting Afflicted Consciences. Bolton was some time )ellow of Bra]en Nose
College, in Oxford, and Rector of Broughton, in Northamtonshire.
AAIbid., p. 23. )rom Bolton
s treatise the quotation is from a writer by the name of
Throgmorton.
3952,53 Burwash, p. 341.
052,54 Burwash, p. 341.
152,56 Burwash, pp. 342, 343.
2S2,61ff. Burwash, pp. 347ff.
3S2,73ff. Burwash, pp. 354ff.
52,80 Burwash, 358.
5-ohn Wesley, Letters HI, p. 78.
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Ibid., pp. 79,80.
AAIbid., p. 79.
SS2,6I Burwash, p. 348.

-ohn Wesley, A Blow at the Root, or Christ Stabb
d in the House of His )riends,
Works (ed. -ackson) X, p. 369. Also, -ohn Wesley, ed. Albert C. Outler, p. 382.
The following sources have helpful discussions and analyses on this theme Harald
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Lindstrom, Wesley and Sanctification, pp 75-82 -ohn 'eschner, Wesley
s
Christology, pp. 93-1 15 two articles in the Wesleyan Theological-ournal, Volume 12,
Spring, 1977 Charles R. Wilson, The Revelance of -ohn Wesley
s 'istinctive
Correlation of Love and Law, pp. 54ff. Charles N. 'illman, Wesley
s Approach to
the Law in 'iscourse XXV on the Sermon on the Mount, pp. 60ff.
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Patristic Research
AThe Status 4uaestionis
by 'avid '. Bundy
A study of Patristics involves not only studying the writings of the
fathers of the church, but studying all aspects of the period which
contribute to an understanding of those writings. In *reek and Latin
literature, however, the patristic period includes all those writings
which can be placed between the New Testament and -ohn of
'amascus. In the traditions encompassed by the Syriac, *eorgian,
Armenian, Ethiopic, Arabic and Coptic languages, on the other
hand, the patristic period extends much later. There is no generally
agreed upon terminal date for any given corpus of literature.
In consideration of this fact, this article does not pretend to be a
complete status questionis. Instead, it seeks to identify a maMor trend
in philosophy and methodology and to indicate certain proMects and
tendencies, reali]ing that there is no hope of providing adequate
coverage.
A Revolution in Methodology
Patristic study has been undergoing a reformation in methodol
ogy. There has been a breakdown in what one might call ideological
approaches,A and an increasing consensus around a particular
methodology which one might designate the structural approach.A
This means primarily that the approaches of -onas,A 'anielou,

PelikanA and Voobus,6, to mention only four, have been found
wanting in their method and analysis, indeed, in their concept of the
nature of the task of patristic study. *nosticism cannot be described
adequately by recourse to the existentialist model the origins of
-ewish-Christianity are infinitely more complicated than 'anielou
suggested Syrian asceticism and the history of the Syriac versions of
the Bible cannot be distilled into the neat paradigms proposed and
defended by Voobus and it is generally felt that the synthesis of
'avid '. Bundy is a 1973 graduate of Asbury Theological
Seminary. He is presently a doctoral student in Belgium.
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Pelikan has come too soon to be useful. What is it then that is
generally felt to be needed"
Primarily, it is an examination of the primary sources, that is, of
the texts themselves as phenomenon worthy of study in their own
right. 'ue attention is to be paid to all diachronic and especially
synchronic relations, but the focus of attention is to be reserved for
the texts as units. Any theories will then arise from this study of texts,
and will not, instead, be developed to explain the texts.
This tension is perhaps best illustrated by example. )rom March
1 1 through 14, 1980, a colloquium on *nosticism and the Hellenistic
World was held at the Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-
Neuve, Belgium. The lectures fell into two distinct categories. The
first included lectures concerned with the origins and diachronic
relations of *nosticism. There were passionate arguments and
appeals for support of theories of Egyptian, Persian, -ewish,
Christian, or Mystery Religions origins or of a theory of syncretism.
The second category included presentations on a given biblical text,
on a gnostic text, and on a text of a Christian critique of a *nostic
system.
'uring the course of the conference, the chairman appointed a
committee composed of seven professors from different universities
to draft a statement about *nosticism and methodology of research
in *nosticism. The committee returned to the conference a statement
which was severely critici]ed for its history-of-religions approach.
The result was a compromise the work of the Colloquium has
indicated the interest that there is to develop thematic studies and
those which would identify the structures of each particular treatise
and as much as possible, to examine its internal coherence and the
doctrine contained therein, this without neglecting the study of
sources, origins and influences.
The structural approach is not without its drawbacks, the most
significant of which may be the problem individual scholars have in
separating their own religious and political beliefs from their
historical study. When there is no generally accepted paradigm to
help depersonali]e historical study and no formation of schools to
push historical inquiry to the logical conclusion of a given system of
thought, the personali]ation of that research appears to be an
inevitable outcome. In practice, this means that the historian
s work
becomes even more severely limited to his knowledge of primary
sources. The synthetic work as practiced by writers such as Martin
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MartyA comes to be built upon the shaky foundations of monographs
of many researchers whose personal concerns and agendas, more
than their ideology, are determinative for their research. This does
not mean, of course, that an ideological approach allows one to
take a stance of obMectivity. 4uite to the contrary. It only means that
when one philosophical perspective dominated the historical
understanding of a period, it provided an agreed upon set of
categories within whose perameters the primary sources were to be
interpreted.
Trends and ProMects
Remarks will be limited here to proMects which appear to be
tendentious and which seem to have the best chance of influencing
patristic scholarship. Such proMects can be grouped into the six
categories below
(1) Source and Bibliographic Control. The Clavis Patrum
Latinorum (2nd ed. Steenbrugge, Belgium), providing a 640 page
inventory of Latin patristics writers from TertuUian to Bede, has been
followed by the even more remarkable Clavis Patrum *raecorum
(Turnhout, Belgium) to be completed in four volumes by Maurice
*eerard. To date we have the second volume (1974) on writers from
Alexander of Alexandria to -ohn Chrysostom and the third (1979)
covering the period from Cyril of Alexandria to -ohn of 'amascus.
These have provided the background of and framework for the CCL
and the CC* (see below).
More Hmited in scope but more exhaustive is the work of Henri
Crou]el, Bibliographie critique d
Origene ^Insixumtnidi Patristica, 8,
'en Haag, 1971), which will soon be followed by a second volume.
Paul -. )edwick of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,
Toronto, is completing Basil of Caesarea A Comprehensive *uide
to All the Manuscripts, Ancient Testimonia and 4uotations,
Editions, Translations and Studies of His Works.
The Bibliographia Patristica (Bonn) attempts to locate all work in
patristic studies and is currently preparing volume 22 (1977). Bulletin
d
arabe chretien (1976 - ) is trying to maintain current bibliographic
control over a corpus of literature defined by language tradition.
Patristics, the newsletter of the North American Patristic Society
published by Professor Louis Swift of the University of Kentucky,
has introduced accounts of recent publications. Both the BAC and
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Patristics also attempt to encourage coordination of research.
Perhaps the most significant proMect in North America is the Hill
Monastic Microfilm Library (HMML) microfilming program of St.
-ohn
s University, Collegeville, Minn., through which microfilms of
manuscripts from all over the world are being collected. The HMML
is establishng itself as an extraordinary center of documentation.
Less broad in scope is the 'ocumentatiecentrum directed by P. SM.
van Koningsveld of the )aculty of Theology at Leiden who is
collecting documentation on the relations between Christianity and
Islam, especially in the Sinai and in Spain.
(2) Publicaton of Texts. The most important series have continued
to expand during the last decade and have announced ambitious
programs for the coming years. The Corpus Christianorum Series
*raeca (CC*) of Leuven, the Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
(CCL) of Steenbrugge and Leuven, the Corpus Scriptorium
Christianorum Orientalium (CSCO) of Louvain, Patrologia
Orientalis (PO) and Sources Chretiennes (SC) of Paris, and the Studi
e Testi (Rome) have established themselves as essential tools for the
patristic scholar.
Of considerable promise are proMects editing several versions of a
given text in close cooperation. The Ascension of Isaiah is being
edited at the Instituto per le Scien]e Religiose at Bologna, Italy in its
*reek, Coptic, Ethiopic, Latin and Slavonic versions. At Louvain-
la-Neuve, Belgium, a team of scholars under the direction of
Professor *erard *aritte is editing the homilies of *regory of
Na]ian]us in Arabic, Armenian, Coptic, *eorgian, and Syriac, as
well as in *reek. This type of work should produce superior editions
of the patristic writings.
(3) Ancillary Studies. The shift toward a structuralist methodology
has served to stimulate ancillary studies. Codicology and palaeo
graphy are receiving badly needed attention. Eric *. Turner
s A
Typology ofthe Early Codex has been well received and the influence
of Scriptorium, a Mournal devoted to manuscript studies, has been
growing.
Sociological and demographic concerns have occupied -ohn *.
*ager, Kingdom and Community The Social World of Early
Christianity (Englewood Cliffs, N.-. Prentice-Hall, 1975) and *erd
Thiessen, Sociologie der -esusbewegung Ein Beitrag ]ur Entste-
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hungsgeschichte des Urchristentums (Munich Kaiser, 1977). They
are marred by their efforts to use early Christianity to support their
social ideals (especially Thiessen) and by the homogeni]ation of
evidence (*ager), but are still important pioneering works. A more
productive use of this type of information has been suggested by
Pauline Allen, The 
-ustianic
 Plague, By]antion 49 (1979), 5-20.
The article adds important features to our understanding of the sixth
century.
Our conceptions of *nosticism and Manichaeism are being
revolutioni]ed by the continued publication of the Nag Hammadi
materials as well as by our understanding of the relationships
between *nosticism and monasticism and the role of *nosticism in
the larger church. An actual edition with )rench translation is being
done under the auspices of the )aculty of Theology, Laval
University, 4uebec in cooperation with -acques Menard of
Strasbourg. This is a welcome addition to the Leiden facsimile
edition published by E.-. Brill, 1972-1977.
Lexicography is being revitali]ed through proMects such as the
Augustinus - Lexikon under the direction of the Augustinus-Institut
der Augustiner at Wurt]burg, BR', and the Ephrem dictionary
proMect of 'r. Margot Schmidt of the University of Regensburg.
(4) Increased Importance of Oriental Patristics. 'ue to the
awareness (heightened by the publication of the CP*) that the
oriental versions of the writings of the Church )athers are very
important witnesses to the textual traditions of those writings, often
providing witnesses centuries earlier than the earliest *reek or, more
rarely, Latin manuscripts, there has been a renewed interest in those
ecclesiastical traditions in their own right. Because of the availability
of many texts now in the CATOand the with modern language or
Latin translations, there has been a gradual reali]ation that the
Oriental Christian traditions have a relevance to contemporary
theological issues. This has resulted in a greatly increased output of
research and publication during the last decade in the field of
Oriental Christian studies.
(5) History ofExegesis and Pneumatology. Current lively topics of
thematic research begin with W. -aeger
s *regor von Nyssa
s Lehre
vom Heiligen *eist (Leiden, 1966) from which there has been a
plethora of dissertations on the Holy Spirit in the writings of
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individual fathers or in groups thereof. Precise reference to these may
be found in Bibliographia Patristica, or in the case of American
dissertations, a subMect search print-out from University Microfilms,
Inc. )or materials relevant to the history of exegesis, reference is
most easily made to Biblica
s bibliographic supplement or to
Ephemerides Theologia Lovanienses.
(6) Liturgy. This vast area of study needs much attention for it is
vitally important in understanding the thought of the Christian
church through the centuries. At the )aculty ofTheology, University
of Amsterdam, there is a proMect in process to gather all of the texts
and bibliographic material relevant to all of the liturgies of all of the
churches. Now in its initial stages, the effort should provide an
invaluable service to the patristics scholar.
Conclusion
Patristic study is a rapidly expanding area of research. It is a field
in which materials are published in hundred of Mournals in at least
forty countries, but in which little is translated from the language of
first publication. It is an area in which the problem of duplicated
work, or misunderstood work, is too commonplace. And it is an area
which has perhaps remained too attached to theology faculties of
Universities. It is to be hoped that the efforts of Bibliographia
Patristica and of other bibliographic control instruments, along with
the increased concern for sound historiography and methology, will
lead to more scientifically sound publications. ᪽
Notes
᪽This term is used to designate doctrinaire methodologies for example, history of
religions, history of dogma, comparative religions, and other similar schools of
thought and method. It is recogni]ed that the term ideological approach is vague.
Also, I do not mean to imply that the questions raised by these disciplines are not
important aspects to be considered.
2)or an exposition of this approach, see -.W. 'ixon, -r., Outline of a Theory of
Structuralism, Cross Currents 22 (1972) 257-280, and -. Piaget, StructuralismiAew
York Basic Books, 1970).
3Hans -onas, *nosis und spatantiker *eist, (*ottingen Vandenhoeck und
Ruprecht, 1934-1935).
-ean 'anieliou, Etudes d
exegese Mudeo-chretienne les testimonia (Paris
Beauchesne, 1966).
5-aroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, A History of the 'evelopment of
'ocrme (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1971- ). The work is to be completed
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in five volumes.
AArthur Voobus, History ofAsceticism in the Syrian Orient, 2 vol. CSCO 184, 197,
Subs. 14.17, (Louvain, 1958-1960), or Early Versions of the New Testament PETSE,
6, (Stockholm Estonian Theological )aculty in Exile, 1954).

'ocument )inal du CoUoque, *nosticisme et Monde Hellenistique (Lou?ain-?a-
Neuve, 11-14 mars 1980), to be published in 1981.
AMartin Marty, A Nation ofBelievers (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1976).
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